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l'l THE SUPREilE COURT OF TEE

STATI: OF CTAH

ROGER SCEJ'!ITT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vsRICHARD A. BILLINGS, SAH S!HTH,
UTAH STATE PRISON, DIVISION OP
CORRECTIONS, DEPARTHENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES OP THE STATE Oc
UTAH, and JAJ'1ES BARTELL,

Case No. l6n34

Defendants-Respondents.:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This action, initiated bv the plaintiff-appellant
in the Court below, in a civil action for specific damages
against officers of the Utah State Prison, the Warden of the
Prison, th9 Division of Corrections Denartment of Social
Services of the State of Utah, and the Prison itself for
defendants-respondents alleged negligent handling of plaintiffappellant's personal oroperty.
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DISPOSITIUc! IN TilE LO\JER COUPT

The lower Court granted the defendant's Motion
to Dismiss the plaintiff's complaint and denied the

P

1

aintiff's

Motion for Summary Judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Respondent urges this Court to

affir~

the trial

court's granting of the Motion to Dismiss and denial of
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
STATEM.ENT OF THE FACTS

The appellant is an inmate at the Utah State Prison
at Draper, Utah (hereinafter, the Prison).

The resnondents

James Bartell and Richard A. Billings at all times pertinent
to this action were employees of the prison and worked there
as property officers under the direction of the respondent
Samuel Smith and the respondent government agency.

At the

time of the filing of this action in the Court below, responden',
Samuel Smith was ••arden of the prison and worked under the
direction of the resPondent government agency.
Directly prior to July 31, 1977, the appellant was
an inmate housed in a cell on the fourth deck of A-Block at
the prison, and was in possession of various items of personal
property.

on or about July 31, 1977, appellant was transfMr~

to another cell within the prison located on B-Block North.
The appellant was instructed not to bring his personal
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l

property to his new cell, but was to!d by

2

prison officer

that his Personal prorerty would be stored by the orison
property officers, the respondents James Bartell and Richard
A. Billings.
On or about November 22, 1977, the appellant was
transferred from B-Block North to A-Block at the prison.
ApPellant requested that the respondents return the personal
items left in his cell on July 31, 1977.

On

Nove~ber

23,

1977, appellant was given the property and signed a receipt
acknowledging receipt of "all the property stored on C-Block."
Appellant later alleged that some of the items of
personal property in his "A" Block cell on July 31, 1977, had
not been returned to him on November 23, 1977.

Allegedly these

missing items include a bathrobe, pair of sandals, wrist
watch, rug, jacket, tape measure, pair of house slippers and
two pair of jeans.
Appellant filed an action with the Prison Grievance
committee.

It was determined that since appellant had signed

the receipt, he had apparently lost no property and no further
action was taken at the Prison level.
This action was filed in the T!1ird Judicial District
court in and for the County of Salt Lake, seeking specific
damages.

The respondents were represented by their counsel,
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and filcc1 a notion to Dism1ss.
for Summary LTudgG1ent.

'l'he plointiff filed a Hotio,

'The '-lotion for Summ,,rv Jm1qf:lc>nt

\·las supported by affidavit.

Appellant also

serve•~

the

respondents with Interrogatories and Requests for 1\dmissions.
These \vere not answered.

Doth parties subr.1i tter1 'lemoranda ir

support of their Motions.

The Motions were argue0 to the

Court on September 8, 1978.

Both Motions were considered

by the Court pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

The Court granted the respondent's rtotion to

Dismiss and denied the appellant's Motion :~or Sumn:ary
Judgment.
The appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on
the dismissal of his Complaint and on the denial of his
Motion for Summary Judgment.
ARGUHENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY \.RANTED
RESPONDENTS' MOTION TO DISMISS FOR
FAILURE TO STATE A CLAir1 FOR HHICH
RELIEF' CAN BE GRANTED.
The standard or review for determining the
propriety of a motion to dismiss is stated in Liquor Control
Commission v. Athas, 121 Utah 457, 263 P.2d 441

(J952).
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The Court in Athas held that:
"If the plaintiff would not be
entitled to recover under any set of
facts which could be proved in support
of his claim, a motion to dismiss is
properly granted."
(242 P. 2d at 443).
The Court in Athas, went further and stated with
reference to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that "trial
courts have wide discretion in applying the rules."
The defense8f

immunity from liability is considered

an affirmative defense under Rule 8(c) of the Ctah Rules of
Civil Procedure.

Generally an affirmative defense is im-

properly plead in a motion to dismiss unless dispositive of
the

c~se

on the face of the pleadings.
The Court has yet to rule specifically on the

propriety of pleading the defense of immunity in a 12(b) (6)
motion to dismiss.

But guidance can be gained from other

cases dealing with this issue.

The Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure are similar to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
In light of the similarity between the two rules,
Federal cases interpreting

Federal Rule 12 should be

considered in determining the propriety of pleading the defense
of immunity in a 12(b) (6) motion.

-5Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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motio:1 tc' c1isr iss rc,quirr,o; the· court_ to

examine the allec;,cctions of the coP1plaint_ and thr> re,;nonsi"c
pleading without resort to other pleaclings or outsicle
evidence.

Camero v. Kostos, 253 F. SupD.

N.J. 1966).

33'

(r_;.s.

D.c.

Affirmative defenses generally require going

beyond the pleadinqs to determine their validity.

A motion

to dismiss is improperly granted if it is based on an
affirmative defense which requires proof, i.e. res judicate
release or discharge in bankruptcy.

Immunity is statutory

and requires no evidentiary proof.
The defense of governmental irrrmnity is properlv
plead therefore in a motion to dismiss if dispositive of
the case.

Caruth v. Geddes, 443 F. Supo. 1295 (D.C. Ill.

1978), Rafferty v. Prince George County, 423 F. Supp. 1045,
(D.C. Md. 1976).
Caruth, supra., dealt with a suit under 42 U.S.C.
section 1983.

It VTas a civil rights action by a state prisone:

against a public defender.

Cases construing 42 U.S.C.

sect~n

1983 provide that a public defender enjoys immunity fron
actions for dar,ages when acting within the scope c·f his or
her employment.

The Court in Caruth stated inununity was a
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d0fcnso properly olcad in a motion to disniss for failure
to state a clairr for which relief can be granted.

The Court

ruled, however, that the granting of the motion was improper
where the complaint contained an allegation of intentional
misconduct.

u.s.c.

Rafferty, suora, was another suit based on 42
section 1983.

Plaintiffs in Rafferty were suing oolice

officers and firemen
an apartment fire.
ground of immunity.

for misconduct in the investigation of
The defendants moved to dismiss on the
Defendants asserted that they were

government officials and employees acting in their official
capacities and therefore immune under 42

r.s.c.

1983.

The

court held that this immunity was qualified and that the
dismissal of the suit by the trial court was improper where
the'complaint contained an allegation of malicious conduct.
Appellant's complaint alleges only negligence on
the part of the defendants.

Appellant further alleges

th~s

negligence occurred while the defendants were acting within
the scope of their official employment.
The general presumption which accompanies a motion
to dismiss, is that the allegations in the complaint must
be taken as true.

Miree v. Dekalb County Ge~rgia, 97 S.Ct.

2490, 433 U.S. 25 (1977).

Following the presumption as to
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the truth of 3ppnllant's allegations, apoellant has still
failed to state a claim for which relief can be~ granted.
Appellant in his comrlaint has plead only
~

1·
neg lgence. ,

Section 63-30-10(10) Utah Code Ann. states that:
"Immunity from suit of all
governmental ~ntities is waived
for injury proximately causeJ bv
the negligent acts or omissions~
fo an employee committed within the
scope of his employment excent
inter alia if the injury:
(10) arises out of the incarceration of any person in any
state prison.
The appellant in his complaint alleges all the
essential elements ennurnerated in section 63-30-10(10).
Respondent plead the defense by motion to dismisE because
it was dispositive.

On the face of the pleadings, apPellant

can prove no set of facts \vhich would entitle him to relief.
The issue of negligence and liability of the individual
defendants is discussed in point II.
The trial court as a matter of law, and in its
discretion properly determined that appellant failed to
state a claim for which relief can be granted.
The purpose of the Rules of Civil Procedure is to
ensure a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
action.

Gardner v. Park v!est Village, 568 P. 2d 7 34 (Utah 1977)
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Respondent by filing a motion to dismiss rather
than an answer sought to comply with the oolicy and purpose
of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

By disposing of this case

on a motion to dismiss, respondent has avoid~d the time,
expense and inconvenience of a hearing

on the merits.

Such

a hearing would be unjustified in light of section 63-30-10(10).
qesoondent asserts that on a motion to ~ismiss, it
was improper for the trial court to go to the merits of the
appellant's case.

On the other hand, even if it were nermissible

to consider the merits, appellant was given a fair hearing
on the merits at the prison level.
The Prison Rules and Procedures Provide that an
innate may file a complaint with the Prison
Committee.

~rievance

The inmate must put in writing the basic facts,

the specific grievance and the relief sought.
complied with these formalities.

Appellant

After the complaint is

submitted to the Prison Grievance Committee, a formal hearing
is held.
At this formal hearing, the defendants produced n
receipt signed by the appellant.

The receipt acknowledged

the fact that appellant had received all his prooertv.
Appellant failed to produce at the hearing anv inventory or
other proof of the existence of the allegedlv missing proPerty.
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The (;rievctnce Cor-cetitU;c c1C>terrinr·<1 after considorinr; the
evidence presented, snecificallv the si~n~d rcceiot, that
appellctnt's claim was without merit.
Despite the existence of section F3-38-lQ(lO),
the Prison has a procedure to give prisoners a remeHy for
internal problems.

Respondent asserts that this remedy was

more than generous in light of section (3-30-10(10).
Respondent does not rely on the investigation of the Prison
Grievance Committee as dispositive hecause this would go to
the merits of appellant's case.

However, appellan-t Vias not

without a remedy and at this state of the litigation,

secti~

63-30-10(10) controls and is dispositive of this case
without reaching the merits.
vlhile it v1ould be improper for the trial court to

consider the merits of appellant's claim should this court
choose to do so, respondent asserts that the hearing at the
prison level disposes of this case on the merits.
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POINT II
THE RESPONDENTS HAY NOT BE SUED
I!JDIVIDUALLY FOR ORDINARY NEGLIGENT
ACTS COHI'HTTED IVITHIN THE SCOPE OF
THEIR Ef,IPLOYNENT.

This Court has consistently held in ordinary
negligence cases like this one that governmental
immunity applies to the individual state employee
acting within the scope of his employment.

Sheffield v.

Turner, 21 Utah 2d 314, 445 P.2d 367 {1968); Ohray v.
Malmberg, 26 Utah 2d 17, 484 P.2d 160 {1971); Anderson
Investment Corp. v. State, 28 Utah 2d 379, 503 P.2d
144

(1972); Roosendaal Construction v. Holman, 28 Utah 2d

3 9 6 1 50 3 p • 2d 4 4 6 ( 19 7 2) •
The Sheffield case is directly in point.

There

the plaintiff was suing the State, the Prison, the Warden
and some prison personnel for negligence.

The plaintiff

claimed negligence in that he received injuries from
another inmate of whose violent propensities

the defendants

were aware.
The Court stated that the Warden was not a
"governmental entity" under the language of the statute
(445 P.2d at 368).
The Court went further and held that the
immunity doctrine upon which Section 63-30-10(10) is
based applies to prison personnel in their individual
capacity.
Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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The Court in Sheffield, suprd, was not unm 1· d
---

of the possibility for abuse by prison personnel.

n fu

They

stated:
"We quite willingly agree that
they [the inmates] should not be
'thrown to the wolves' without
protection, and that some safeguards
should he maintained to prevent such
abuse or injury.
On the other side of this proposition is the imperative need for those in
a supervisory capacity to have reasonable
freedom to discharge the burdensome
responsibilities of keeping in confinement and maintaining discipline of a
large number of men who have been
convicted of serious crime.
If such
officials are too vulnerable to lawsuits
for anything untoward which may happen
to inmates a number of evils follow,
including a breakdown of discipline and
the fact that capable persons would be
discouraged from taking such public
positions."
445 P.2d at 368-369.
Moreover, the Court went on to conclude:
• the Warden and other prison
officers are protected by the doctrine
of sovereign immunity against claims of
negligence so long as they are acting in
good faith and within the scope of their
duties, and that they could not be held
liable unless they were guilty of some
conduct which transcended the bounds of
good faith performance of their duty by
a wilful or malicious wrongful act which
they know or should know would result in
injury."
445 P.2d at 369.
The appellant has failed to allege in any of
his pleadings

any intentional or malicious misconduct

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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which would bring him within the exception of Sheffield.
Appellant contends that the individual
respondents are liable and relies on the recent case of
Madsen v. State of Utah, 583 P.2d 92 (Utah 1978).
Respondent submits that Madsen is in complete
accord with the reasoning and authorities already cited,
and does not allow relief in this case.
Madsen, supra, was a suit for wrongful death
by the wife and daughter of an inmate.

The action in

t1adsen was brought in the Third District Court against
the State of Utah, Division of Corrections, the Warden,
and other prison personnel.

The defendants in Madsen

moved for a dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

In support of their

motion, defendants cited Section 63-30-10(10) as
dispositive.

The trial court granted the motion to

dismiss on that basis.
The plaintiffs in Madsen appealed the dismissal
to this Court.

This Court affirmed the trial court's

ruling as to the State of Utah and the other governmental
entities.

The case was reversed and remanded as to the

individual defendants to determine their liability for
the wrongful death of Mr. Madsen.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Wrongful death has traditionally been a
statutory tort, specifically giving the heirs of the
This follows fro~ the

decedent a cause of action.

traditional notion that a tort is personal to the
injured party and the cause of action dies with him
(see generally Prosser, Law of Torts section 127,
{'lrongful Death).
Wrongful death has traditionallv been based
on different or more than one degree of fault of the
defendant, i.e., negligence, recklessness, malicious,
wilful and/or intentional misconduct.

There is some

authority for strict liability in wrongful death actions
as well.

The Tungus v. Skougaard, 358

u.s.

589 (1958),

Prosser, supra, section 127.
Utah Code Ann.

§

76-11-7

(1933), allows the

heirs of the deceased to maintain an action for wrongful
death caused by the "wrongful act" or neglect of another.

This Court has yet to define the bounds of "wrongful
act."

Presumably it covers intentional and malicious acts.

Conceivably, it could even be interpreted to mean acts
which amount to less than negligence and approach strict
liability.

358 U.S. at 590.
The complaint in Madsen, being based on the

wrongful death statute, by implication contained an

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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allegation of ''wrongful acts."

A motion to dismiss in

Madsen could not properly dispose of the ''wrongful acts"
element of the cause of action.

Section 63-30-10(10)

refers only to negligent acts.
The Court in Madsen concluded that there were
not enough facts before it to determine the degree of
culpability of the individual defendants.

Since wrongful

death may be based on intentional or malicious acts,
the Court remanded the case to determine liability.
If on remand it was determined the death of Mr. Madsen
resulted from ordinary negligence, Section 63-30-10(10)
would apply as in Sheffield. Such a conclusion is
consistent with the previous policy of this Court with
regard to the governmental immunity statute.
Justice Maughan in a brief concurring opinion
argued that Madsen should be limited to its facts.
Justice Maughan asserts that Section 63-30-10(10) should
be strictly construed and applied only to conduct related
to incarceration, rather than surgery.

This would

take Madsen out of the exception of paragraph 10 of
Section 63-30-10 and allow recovery.
The Court in Madsen declined to overrule the
long line of cases disallowing recovery for negligent
acts of state employees committed within the scope of
their employment.

The Court in Madsen states that the
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legislative purpose of Section n3-30-10(10) is to
prevent frivolous and harrassing suits against the
state.

583 P.2d at 94.

This is the same reasoning

the Court in Sheffield applied.
The appellant by his complaint even if
taken as true has alleged no more than negligence.
Appellant has alleged the defendants were acting
within the scope of their employment.

Appellant has

not alleged in his comnlaint bad faith or misconduct
on the part of the defendants.
Furthermore, even if the trial court were
to consider the requests for admissions and consider
them as true, appellant is in no better position.
The request for admissions if taken as true establish
only negligence.

This case is the type the legislature sought
to prevent by enacting Section 63-30-10(10).

Factually

Madsen and the present case show no similarity.

In

th~

case the appellant was transferred from Medium to
Maximum Security for disciPlinary action.

Appellant

claims certain property was in his cell and that the
property was held for him by the prison officials.
Appellant alleges that despite his signing a receipt

for all his property, some of the property was missing.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The missing property allegedly consisted of a bathrobe,
a pair of slippers and two pair of blue jeans.

Compared

to the loss of life in Madsen, appellant's alleged loss
of his bathrobe and blue jeans must be considered
frivolous and fits and kind of lawsuit the legislature
intended Section 63-30-10(10) to prevent.
Madsen is further distinguishable on its
facts.

In Madsen, the heirs are suing

inmate himself.

rather than an

The statutory right is theirs and they

are not incarcerated or the injury does not arise out
of their incarceration.
The Madsen case, then, is distinguishable on
its facts and consistent with the decisions previously
cited, specifically Sheffield.
The controlling case in the circumstances of
the present action is and should be Sheffield.

Further-

more, from a policy standpoint, any other interpretation
of Section 63-30-10(10) than the one given in Sheffield
and urged by the respondents contravenes the purpose of
an immunity statute.
Section 63-30-10(10) is limited to negligence.
It does not forbid suits against either governmental
entities or individual employees for intentional malicious
or even reckless acts.

The appellant is also given a

remedy for negligence at the prison level.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Respondents submit the tr.ial court properly
grantC'd respondents' Rule 12 (b) (6) motion based on
Section 63-30-10(10) and its proper application to the
facts.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S
MOT I0!1 FOR SUf1MARY JUOG11ENT.
For the same reasons it was proper to grant
respondents' motion to dismiss, it was proper to deny
appellant's motion for summary judgment.
Summary judgment is proper only where there
is no issue of material fact.
542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975).

Holbrook Co. v. Adams,

Summary judgment is also

improper where as here the defendant has a valid
defense.

Disabled American Veterans v. Hendrixson.

9 Utah 2d 152, 340 P.2d 416

(1959).

The defense of immunity in this case not only
precludes summary judgment, but is dispositive of the
case for the reasons stated in Point I.

Appellant

admits there is an issue of material fact and later
there are no real issues of material fact.

cla~s

He states

that defendants' failure to respond to the requests for
admissions under Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Civil
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Procerture establishes all the elements of his claim.
This is against the great weight of authority interpreting
Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Procedure.
Failure to answer requests for admissions
does not automatically constitute an admission.

The

trial court in its discretion may allow additional time
and refuse to grant summary judgment.
States, 416 F.2d 1149

French v. United

(9th Cir. 1968).

The trial court in this case had the discretion
to disregard the requests for admission for several
reasons.

First, they were improper to consider on a

motion to dismiss.

Second, the defense of immunity was

dispositive of the case even if the trial court were to
consider the admission and deem them as true.

The

requests for admissions if taken as true establish no
more than the negligence of the defendants.
Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
illustrate the degree of discretion the trial court
has in applying these rules.

Rule 37 deals with the

sanctions for failure to make discovery.
Rule 37(c} lists a number of findings the
trial court can make justifying the failure to make
discovery.

The Court may find:
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(2) the admission sought
was of no substantial importance, or
(3) the party failinq to admit had
reasonable ground to believe that he
might prevail on the matter, or (d)
there was other good reason for failure
to admit."
Rule 37(a) also requires the appellant to
move the court to order compliance with discovery.
The appellant has not done that in this case.

If the

party fails to comply with the Rule 37 order compelling
them to respond to the admissions, the requesting
party must then prove the admissions.

Rule 37(e)

allows the party requesting the admissions to collect
costs and expenses incurred in proving the unanswered
admissions.

As noted previously the trial court may

find any one of a number of reasons justifying the
failure to answer the requests for admissions.
Respondent in this case submits that the failure
to answer the request for admissions was justified for
several reasons.

The admission was not important in that

it would prove or disprove only ordinary negligence from
which respondents are immune from liability.

Respondents

had reasonable ground to believe, based on Sheffield and
similar cases, that they would prevail on the matter.
Finally, respondents believed that the insignificance
of the claim and the expense involved in responding to
the request for admissions were good reasons for faili~
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Appellant seems to rely on the recent case
of Gardner v. Park Hcst

\~illage,

of his contention that summary
have been granted.

~·

judg~ent

in support
should

From the outset it should be noted

that the result in Gardner is harsh.

Gardner is also a

case uncommon on its facts and in the result reached.
The plaintiff in Gardner filed a complaint
and requested admissions under Rule 36.

The defendant

failed to answer on time and failed to request leave
of the court for more time.

After the Court granted

more time the defendant failed to appear at the hearing
on the motions and failed to respond to discovery.
The defendant's dilatory tactics cost the plaintiff a great
deal of both time and money in proving his claim.
The rules were designed to secure a just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.
568 P.2d at 738.

The result in the Gardner case is

harsh but justified in light of the defendant's costly
delays and uncooperative attitude.
Respondent asserts that the failure to respond
to the requests for admissions in this case was in the
interest of a speedy and inexpensive determination of
the case.

The result would have been the same even

though the respondent had answered the requests for
admissions.
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The trial court properly denied annellant's
motion for surrunary judgment.

The application of Pules

36 and 37 is largely a m~tter of discretion with the
trial court.

The Gardner court was careful to note:

• • • the imposition of the sanctions
of Rule 37 must be tempered by a careful
exercise of judicial discretion." 568
P.2d at 738.
CONCLUSION
The trial court dismissed appellant's claim
in a proper exercise of discretion.

In a case such as

this, appellant is afforded a remedy at an administrative
level.
The intent of the Legislature in enacting Section
63-30-10(10) was to deal with cases like this.
The trial court properly interpreted the policy
and purpose of both Section 63-30-10(10) and the Utah R~a
of Civil Procedure.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARLO\'l
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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